

BANKERS AND BROKERS.

Baring, Magoun & Co.

15 Wall Street, New York.

Foreign Exchange,
Letters of Credit,
Investment Securities.

English Consols Bought and Sold

AGENTS AND MANAGERS FOR
BANKING BROTHERS & Co., Ltd., London.
KIDDER, PEABODY & Co., Boston.

Vermilye & Co.

BANKERS.

NEW YORK. BALTIMORE. BOSTON.

Dealers in U. S. Government Bonds
and other Investment Securities.
List of Current Offerings fur-
nished upon application.
Deposits received and interest al-
lowed on Balances, subject to
draft at sight.
Members of the New York and
Boston Stock Exchanges.

Giffert M. Plympton, Theo. A. Gardner, Wm. L. McKenna

Plympton,
Gardner & Co.

BANKERS.

Members New York Stock Exchange.

Receive deposits subject to check
and allow interest on balances.
Bonds and stocks bought and sold
on commission.

Investment Securities.

LIST ON APPLICATION.
27 William St., Cor. 232 E. 11th St.,
Exchange Place, N. Y. Chicago.

GOODMAN & Co.

2 WALL STREET.

Securities Bought and Sold
on Commission.BANK STOCKS
A SPECIALTY.Chas. D. Barney Jay Cooke, 3d
J. Horace Harding Chas. S. Phillips

Chas. D. Barney & Co.

BANKERS AND BROKERS

25 Broad Street
NEW YORK122 South Fourth Street
PHILADELPHIAKountze Brothers,
BANKERS.

Broadway & Cedar St. NEW YORK

Investment Securities.

Allow interest on deposits; make
cable and telegraphic transfers.
Buy and sell Foreign Exchange.

Letters of Credit.

Issued available the world over.

Henry Clows & Co.,

BANKERS.

11, 13, 15 AND 17 BROAD ST.

Members of the N. Y. Stock Exchange.
Orders executed on margin.
Interest allowed on deposits, subject to check.
Financial Agents for corporations and in-
vestors. Government and other High-Grade Bonds
bought and sold.

Letters of Credit.

Issued available the world over.

N. W. HARRIS & CO.

BANKERS

Pine Street, Corner William

Chicago NEW YORK Boston

Receive deposits subject to check
and allow interest on balances.
Act as fiscal agents for municipal,
railroad and corporation bonds.
Letters of credit and deal in

BONDS FOR INVESTMENT

LIST ON APPLICATION

Bertron, Storrs & Griscom

BANKERS.

40 Wall Street, Land Title Building,
NEW YORK. PHILADELPHIA.

INVESTMENT SECURITIES.

BONDS.

TO HOLDERS OF THE

Cincinnati & Indianapolis 7s

MATURING NOVEMBER 1st, 1904

WE OFFER IN EXCHANGE

Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago &
St. Louis 4s

MATURING DECEMBER 1, 1903

Further particulars upon application.

Farson, Leach & Co.,

BANKERS.

46 Nassau Street, New York,
CHICAGO, PHILADELPHIA, BOSTON.

WE OWN AND OFFER

\$100,000

South Side, Elevated, Chicago,
First Mortgage 4% Bonds, 1924.Company operates under General Railroad Law of
Illinois.NET EARNINGS FOUR AND A HALF TIMES
INTEREST CHARGES.

PRICE ON APPLICATION.

N. W. HALSEY & CO.

BANKERS.

40 WALL STREET, NEW YORK.

FINANCIAL.

The Wall Street Journal has the largest cir-
culation of any financial publication in Amer-

THE FINANCIAL SITUATION.

Outside of the reported purchase of the Ontario and Western Railroad property by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, there was last week hardly any development in the financial world worthy of the name. The purchase was not officially confirmed, but Wall Street believes that announcement of the fact will soon be made, and that even if the New Haven company is not the buyer, some other railroad company is, or soon will be. It is admitted that the Ontario and Western is for sale. No doubt, the New Haven people can make as good use of the Ontario and Western as anybody else can. In the great coal strike in 1902 the New Haven suffered more than any other railroad in the country by reason of its well high complete exclusion from coal supplies. It is imperative that this should not happen again; coal strikes are not, after all, things of the past, and, moreover, in normal times the New Haven will have no difficulty in distributing all the coal that the Ontario and Western can furnish to it. The means of connection between the two lines will be, of course, the Poughkeepsie bridge. The news of this sale, though by no means a surprising circumstance, seemed to heighten very much the excitement now prevailing in speculative circles. It made it appear possible that another era of "buying for control" in the railway world was dawning. With the Ontario and Western out of the way, the Erie was left, as the one remaining independent trunk line; ought not every one to own some portion of the more than \$250,000,000 of Erie securities possessing voting power in order to be able to sell the same at a large profit when the contest for the ownership of the property began? Rumors were put in circulation regarding the "ultimate destiny" of such railway companies as the Chicago and Great Western, Missouri, Kansas and Texas, Wisconsin Central, Toledo, St. Louis and Western, and, indeed, concerning all the minor railway properties, and there was much buying of the stock of all of these railways in consequence. A question greatly discussed last week was as to the extent to which the "public" had been deceived by the stock market. On the face of things it would seem that a market where daily transactions were running well above a minimum of a million shares and at times approximating double that quantity was clearly dominated by an "outside" interest and that the charge that such a market was merely manipulated was ill founded. But if the judgment of a majority of the heads of the great commission houses in Wall Street is held to be conclusive in the matter the fact is that the market is now composed of about one-fifth public and four-fifths manipulation or purely professional speculation. That is, that while public interest in the market is unquestionably greater than it has been at any time before during the year and that in so large a volume of trading the orders from outsiders foot up, even in the small proportion named, a very considerable total yet the market is still in the main an affair either of professional operations or the steps taken by great capitalist interests. This opinion, it must be confessed, coincides with the view of most of those who confine their observations merely to the play of the stock quotation instruments alone. The dealings one day in 100,000 shares or more of a particular security and in the next day in the same security of a relative small amount, very enormous sudden buying, jammed into an hour's space, of some one stock, which advances the price of the issue mightily; equally enormous apparent buying on other days in a few securities which leaves their price practically unchanged; the liquidation apparent last week in many stocks which have until recently been the market leaders while others in the list there was activity and buoyancy—these and other similar characteristics of the market are such as could not occur in one governed by a broad and general public enthusiasm. A fair idea, in general, of what sort the present market may be gathered from the circumstance that the "scalping" operations of one room trader alone, conducted wholly for his single personal account, caused him to buy and sell in the course of one day's session of the Stock Exchange last week, 127,000 shares of stock. Nevertheless, although a sober-minded and experienced operator in stocks knows full well that conditions such as have been described are ephemeral and that the market in which they exist rises as hollow as can be, the last thing he thinks of doing is to contend against them in his own speculative ventures or to attempt to set bounds to the length of time that such conditions will prevail. Those who are not in sympathy with the present upsurge of security prices are perfectly well aware that what is going on is merely the natural effluence of a growth which started months before and which they were then in sparse company in observing; and they recognize, too, that among the sanguine and sentimentalist American people the tendency to rush all such movements in either direction to greater extremes than at the outset of the movement sensible people deemed possible. For all that, the end of such frenzies, even if they are in a sense artificial frenzies, will come as surely as the winter frosts and as resistlessly as the rising of the sea.

The great speculation that is now going on in Wall Street—even if it has not yet infected and may not infect, as it did in 1902, the people of the whole country, for the good reason that the people in the West who are relatively rich distrust Wall Street and that the people of the East, who would ordinarily be excited buyers of stocks at this time, are relatively poor—is, in fact, a prodigious speculation that the business of the country next year will be practically as active and profitable as it was in the extraordinary period between 1898 and 1902. There are substantial reasons, and they have been evident ever since last spring, for the belief that our next season's general business would be an improvement over that of the one which is now just closing. Thoughtful observers were early impressed this year with the conviction that if the year's crops were good a distinct business revival would take place; that is, if an orgy in the stock market did not strangle it before its birth. And this attracts attention to the one event last week which really caused more comment in the financial community than any other. That was the speech of Mr. Vanderlip, one of the vice-presidents of the National City Bank, before the Illinois State Bankers' Association at their meeting in St. Louis. For reasons that need not retelling here, the speculative portion of Wall Street looked forward with interest to what Mr. Vanderlip had to say. He pointed out in graphic language the vast increase in our total wealth in the last ten years, the enlargement of our money stock and bank deposits, and the marvellous growth of all of our productive industries. Our prosperity in this period, he said, had been such as no other country in any age had ever known and the expansion of our business had been unexampled and beyond all the experience of men of affairs; and with this statement all intelligent economists will agree. Then, while declaring "that encouragement to a speculative boom at this time, when improvement is justifi-

ably based on hopes and possibilities than on immediate actual conditions, might stay the whole period of recovery," and that "if the banks in the United States are unconservative in the inducements they hold out to secure deposits and to accumulate great stocks of money which will loan at such low rates as to encourage unduly a speculative spirit, they will strike a blow at this returning prosperity," he declared that our country was in as favorable a position for development in the next ten years as it was at the beginning of the last ten year period. If Mr. Vanderlip's hearers really believed this last statement his caution to them to beware of over-speculation fell upon deafened ears.

Every well informed citizen of the United States is, like Mr. Vanderlip, a firm believer in the great and growing prosperity of his country and regards with general optimism his country's future. But this does not mean that the prospect of prosperity is sure to be at a uniform rate nor justify the assertion, specifically, that ten year stages of "unexampled" prosperity are likely to succeed each other in our national life. Rather does the history of the country point to the entire improbability of such an occurrence. What was our condition in 1894, the starting point of ten years ago? We were in a condition of general economic starvation which had not even then, in fact, reached its acme. Under-consumption was the rule throughout the business world. This one statement covers all the myriad forms of the depression from which we were then suffering and which was one of the most severe in our business records. Is it to be expected that the advance from our present high level of national prosperity could repeat the same resilience as did the great reaction from the bitterly hard times ten years since? To use one illustration only, let reference be made to the iron and steel business, which is usually called the backbone of the country's general industrial life. The core of the iron and steel business is its orders from railways, more than one-third of the total tonnage of the finished product of the United States Steel Corporation being in steel rails alone. After 1894 our railroads found themselves under the necessity of practically replacing their entire construction. Larger engines, heavier rails, firmer bridges, etc., all were required, and the greatest rebuilding of railroads in the history of the country proceeded. Is it possible that such a rebuilding is again at hand? For many years after 1894 the gold production of our country and the world increased so much more rapidly than did the demand for funds made by new business and the issue of new securities, that there was brought about a material inflation in the price of securities and commodities. Today business is enlarged that a current production of money fully as great as that which now takes place is required to sustain the new business and the new security issues that offer. The figures given by Mr. Vanderlip in his address indicate, paradoxical as it may seem, that our credit position is now less strong than it was ten years ago. Our money stock in 1894 was \$1,000,000,000 and bank deposits, that is, extensions of credit, were \$4,000,000,000. This was a ratio of \$1 in cash to \$3 in credits. Today we have \$2,500,000,000 of money and \$10,000,000,000 of deposits, a ratio of \$1 in cash to \$4 of credits. Ten years hence, again using Mr. Vanderlip's statistics, the ratio will be, at the same rate of progress, \$1 in cash to \$6 in deposits. Will that serve to put business on a firmer basis or to make credit collapse less liable to occur? We all of us have "bulls on our country," but we should not, nevertheless, in taking thought of the future or the present, strip ourselves of common sense or forget the plain and terrible lessons of the past.

FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL.

RAILROAD AND OTHER BONDS.

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THE SUN, MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1904.

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